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The U.S. Army Chief Information Officer (CIO/G6) recognized potential communication and 
collaboration issues in performing C2 for Force Sustainment Soldiers working at Forward 
Operating Bases in Southwest Asia.  The G6 commissioned a study to determine what network 
enabled capabilities would improve Logistics tasks in this area of operations.  This paper outlines 
the methodology employed to identify and prioritize those gaps based on their impact on the 
efficacy of Transportation operations.  This unique methodology is based on mapping 
operationally significant and doctrinally defined tasks to C2 concepts as defined in the Network 
Centric Operational Environment Joint Integrating Concept.  It brought together the usually 
isolated Signal Community and Logistics Community with ways that they can assist each other 
in the transition to net-centric communications.  The recommendations of this study included 
integrated solution packages that will significantly improve Transportation operations by 
increasing their ability to access net-centric domains while minimizing operational risk and cost.  
This approach can be applied across the acquisition process and, more importantly, inform 
requirements documents and early systems engineering efforts for agile C2 outside the traditional 
realm of Combat Arms. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
1.1  PROBLEM OVERVIEW 
If Soldiers were polled in World War II, they would have said that their most important piece of 
personal equipment was their weapon.  Today, in Southwest Asia, Soldiers say that their cell phone or 
internet connection is the most important.  This is as expected because instead of a single bullet or single 
weapons systems, the most critical thing on the battlefield today is information.  To support information 
sharing, Soldiers are finding that information technology (IT) is the key to success whether they are an 
Infantry Soldier (e.g. downloading maps and current intelligence to their PDA) or a Logistician (e.g. 
getting real-time visibility of shipments on the Main Supply Routes).  To fulfill these IT requirements, the 
Army Signal Corps has the mission of responding to critical voice, data, and video requirements for the 
battlefield and then fielding systems that can provide that service at the appropriate time in the 
appropriate place.   
During the past decade, the US Army has designed and fielded numerous systems geared toward 
the Soldier in combat.  These include Blue Force Tracker, Smart Ballistics, and Improved Body Armor.  
Millions of dollars have been spent, years of research have been completed, and hundreds of 
organizations have participated – all to improve the odds of success for the Combat Arms Soldier.  But 
what about the rest of the Army?  The other branches of service seem to be behind in receiving updated 
IT.  The investment has been in enabling Information Age C2 for front-line defenders at the expense of 
the logisticians.  That is, there has been little attention paid to network-centric logistics or C2 for Force 
Sustainment Soldiers.  Recent studies, including the June 2007 Tactical Networks for Ground Forces, 
anecdotal evidence obtained from Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs), combatant commander’s 
integrated priority lists (IPL), and lessons learned from theater support the need for the smooth integration 
of the individual sustainment Soldier into the government-provided network.  The current practice of 
turning a blind eye to Soldiers purchasing non-supported COTS devices to be used in the field introduces 
security issues, raises spectrum use problems, and reduces agility.   
Therefore, in January 2008 the Army CIO/G6 Office tasked TRAC-Monterey to conduct a 
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) on the network enabled capability gaps faced by Transportation 
Soldiers in Southwest Asia working on a Forward Operating Base (FOB).  This represents a more 
narrowly bounded subset of the entire logistics and combat support problem.  Only transportation tasks 
were considered and only in the context of FOBs in Southwest Asia.  The idea was to 1) determine what 
Transportation Tasks Soldiers and Civilians have a difficulty performing to standard, 2) prioritize these 
task gaps based on their risk to the overall mission and 3) identify the application of network enabled 
capabilities to reduce the mission risk.  TRAC-Monterey partnered with the Naval Postgraduate School in 
executing this study and this paper summarizes that effort.  In order to discuss these efforts in the 
following sections, an overview of the CBA methodology is given under the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS) Overview. 
  
1.2  JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 
(JCIDS) OVERVIEW 
Prior to the introduction of the JCIDS process in June 2003, DoD employed a threat-based force-
planning construct (left side of Figure 1) to develop forces, systems, and platforms.  This methodology 
was based on specific threats and scenarios.  Additionally, requirements were often developed, validated, 
and approved as stand-alone solutions that never took into account the overarching DoD system of 
systems design.  This mentality created a “bottom up, stove-piped” approach to acquisition decisions that 
routinely created solutions that were not interoperable, not linked to the National Military Strategy, not 
coordinated between military services, and routinely failed to consider non-material solutions.   
In contrast, the JCIDS process is a capabilities-based process that, as shown on the right of the 
below figure, facilitates force planning in an uncertain environment and identifies the broad set of 
capabilities that will be required to address the challenges of the 21st century.   According to the Defense 
Acquisition University, the purpose of the JCIDS process is to “identify capability gaps and redundancies, 
determine the attributes of a capability or combination of capabilities that would resolve the gaps, identify 
materiel and non-materiel approaches for implementation and roughly assess the cost and operational 
effectiveness of the joint force for each of the identified approaches.” (Defense Acquisition University, 
https://acc.dau.mil)  The purpose is to accurately describe needed capabilities that are explicitly connected 
to doctrinally-defined concepts and communicate those to the acquisition community. 
The key to the JCIDS process is a three-step methodology collectively termed “Capabilities-
Based Assessment” (CBA).  The three steps are Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs 
Analysis (FNA), and Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA).   
 
 
FIGURE 1. CBA Process for this study 
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 The FAA “identifies the mission area or military problem to be assessed, the concepts to be 
examined, the timeframe in which the problem is being assessed, and the scope of the assessment.” 
(CJCSM 3170.01C)  The FAA answers the question “What are we trying to accomplish and how do we 
measure it?”  The FAA examines the desired objectives, the required effects, and links capabilities back 
to defense strategy.  The output for this study is the Transportation Tasks (along with their updated 
conditions and standards) that net-centricity could positively influence.     
The FNA is designed to “assesses the capabilities of the current and programmed force to meet 
the relevant military objectives of the scenarios chosen in the Functional Area Analysis (FAA) using 
doctrinal approaches.”(CJCSM 3170.01C)  The FNA answers the question “How good are we at doing it 
with today’s programmed forces and systems?”  Namely, the FNA looks to identify if capability gaps do 
exist and to also find any overlaps or redundancies in the current operating set.  The output is a prioritized 
listing of the net-centric capability gaps facing the individual Transportation Soldier and the associated 
operational risk assessment.   
The FSA is a “joint assessment of potential DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities) and policy approaches to solving, or at least 
mitigating, one or more of the capability gaps identified in the FNA.”(CJCSM 3170.01C)  The FSA 
answers the question “What should we do about it?”  The output of the FSA for this study is the optimal 
combination of DOTMLPF solutions to achieve the required capabilities for the warfighter.   
 
1.2 OUTLINE OF PAPER 
An overview of the paper outline is given in this section. In this paper, Section 2.0 will discuss in 
detail the methodology carried out, with various subsections discussing the execution and analysis of the 
Functional Area Analysis (FAA), the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), and the Functional Solutions 




This section discusses in detail the overall methodology executed in the CBA study. Details of the 
FAA, FNA, and FSA are discussed. 
 
2.1 FUNCTIONAL AREA ANALYSIS (FAA) METHODOLOGY 
For the FAA, the research focused on the tasks that an individual Transportation Soldier would be 
expected to perform in a deployed location. The overall FAA methodology carried out in this study can be 
seen in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2. FAA Methodology 
First, we captured the “As Is” situation: the existing Transportation system of systems that is not 
entirely satisfactory.  As in any systems engineering effort, understanding the shortcomings of the 
predecessor system is key to requirements analysis (Kossiakof & Sweet).  This was done by 1) examining 
the DoD operating concepts for both net-centricity and transportation and 2) discussions with personnel 
performing those tasks in the field.  Additionally, we created operational vignettes depicting scenarios in 
which these Transportation tasks are not accomplished to standard.   
The second step of the FAA was to determine the necessary objectives in the “To Be” situation.  
Namely, what should the end state system be able to perform?  This information came from not only the 
official tasker from the sponsor, but also from numerous discussions with them and other Signal Corps 
leaders.  Also taken into consideration was the opinion of experienced Transportation leaders on the 
ground on what they feel success would look like and how it should be measured.    
Once the “As Is” and ‘To Be” situations were defined, we mapped the military’s sustainment 
tasks down to the individual Soldier level.  They were then reduced to the tasks that could be affected by 
the application of a net-centric capability.  The resulting task list served as the input into the FNA, thereby 
focusing the rest of the study on the sub-set of Transportation tasks most likely to be impacted by net-
centric principles.   
 
2.1.1. Transportation task cross-walk 
For this research, we needed to scope the entire Transportation mission down to the key 
capabilities that are required within a deployed environment.  We began with the three core transportation 
capabilities as outlined in the Transportation FAA conducted by United States Army Combined Arms 
Support Command (CASCOM) in May 2005.  Further confirmation of these three key capabilities came 
from the 6th Transportation Battalion stationed at Fort Eustis, Virginia.  This battalion provided first-hand 
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information about the Transportation mission in Southwest Asia and shared their Battalion Mission 
Essential Task List (METL).  METLs are the essential tasks that a unit must be proficient on in order to 
accomplish their wartime mission.   
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff CBA Guide, the FAA must “determine, develop, and 
document enabling tasks supporting required capabilities”. (JCS J-8, CBA User Guide)  Upon the 
identification of the core Transportation capabilities, they must be mapped to individual tasks in order to 
facilitate analysis.  Multiple Army Transportation training manuals were studied to gain insights on 
critical collective/team tasks.  Once collective tasks were defined and mapped to the core Transportation 
capabilities, then the collective tasks could be broken down into individual tasks by additionally 
referencing the Military Skills and Qualification (MQS) manuals for task title, conditions, and standards.  
Both officer and enlisted individual tasks were found to support the identified collective tasks.   
Additionally, we validated current conditions and standards that the individual tasks are to be 
conducted in.  Starting with the conditions listed in the MQS, the tasks’ condition statements were 
updated to capture the joint aspect to operations currently being conducted within theater.  These were 
tailored to the three METL tasks and patterned after the verbiage used in the Transportation FAA.  Also, 
key attributes from the Joint Logistics Joint Integrating Concept (capacity, visibility, reliability, velocity, 
and precision) were added to the tasks’ standards in order to measure success for this study.   
  Following this methodology, 195 individual transportation tasks were identified that support the 
core Transportation capabilities conducted on FOBs.  For example, one of these tasks is “Process unit for 
unit movement” which falls under the key Transportation capability of Movement Control Operations.  
The entire list of tasks can be found in TRAC-Monterey ISWTN FAA Report.  
 
2.1.2.  Net-Centric Capabilities 
The Network Centric Operational Environment (NCOE) Joint Functional Concept identified 21 
capabilities within the framework of net-centricity.  The NCOE Joint Integrating Concept took these 21 
capabilities and refined them into 16 capabilities based on war games and analysis.  The NCOE Joint 
Capabilities Document further refined the 16 into 13 capabilities.  Finally, during the FAA process, it was 
determined that only 10 of the 13 capabilities were relevant to the Transportation community.  Those ten 
relevant capabilities are: Continuous Knowledge, Skills & Attributes (KSA), Decisions & Planning, 
Relationships, Situational Understanding, Collaboration, Create & Produce Information, Exchange 
Information, Interoperability, Process Data, and Network Infrastructure. 
 
2.1.3.  Data collection 
At this point, we had assembled a list of doctrinally-defined transportation tasks along with their 
conditions and standards for accomplishment.  And, we had the “official” definitions of network centric 
capabilities.  The next step was to determine any relationships between those lists.  A web-based 
questionnaire asked Transportation Soldiers to link the Transportation tasks to the net-centric capabilities 
and validate the metrics and standards for the tasks.  The questionnaire had three parts.  The first part of 
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the questionnaire collected demographic data such as rank, MOS, education level, and duration of 
experience in a combat zone.   This information tailored the remaining parts of the questionnaire to their 
experiences. 
The second part of the questionnaire explored the links between the transportation tasks and net-
centric capabilities.  The participant was given the sub-set of Transportation tasks within their expertise 
(based on provided demographic data).  These were the tasks that are either in their primary MOS or in an 
MOS with which they had supervisory experience.  The following question was posed: 
For each task below, select which Net-Centric capabilities have any impact (good or bad) on 
your ability to complete the task. 
The respondent then could choose as many of the previously defined net-centric principles that 
applied. 
The third part of the questionnaire contained an evaluation of the standards and conditions of the 
tasks.  Participants were presented two different scenarios for each of their tasks.  They were asked to 
evaluate the proposed standard as if they had all the required net-centric capabilities, and then they were 
asked to evaluate it under the current conditions within theater.    
This first questionnaire was posted for 3 weeks and received 49 responses from individuals in 
operational units (both CONUS and SWA) and individuals at the Transportation Schoolhouse (Advanced 
Non-Commissioned Officer Course, Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course, and Captains Career 
Course.  
Multiple focus group discussions were conducted to gain further insights into the processing of 
cargo and personnel into, around, and out of theater.  Participants consisted of Officers, Motor Transport 
Operators, Cargo Specialists, and Transportation Management Coordinators who were deployed or 
recently deployed.  They discussed their personal experiences regarding transportation tasks and how 
additional communications could impact their mission accomplishment rate.  Special attention was paid to 
the processes and technologies which enable in-transit visibility (ITV) and how different units handle 
frustrated cargo.   
Now, this was a unique approach.  We were asking senior enlisted personnel and junior officers 
with training and experience in transportation operations about network centricity.  Of course, some time 
was dedicated to simplifying and communicating these concepts to the participants.  However, it was well 
worth it because it provided results that were directly connected to mission accomplishment rather than 
C2 theory. 
 
2.1.4.   Analysis 
The data collected during the FAA was then analyzed in order to identify the Transportation tasks 
that could be affected by the application of a net-centric capability.  If a task could not be improved by 
executing it within the NCOE, then it was dropped from the investigation.  For example, the 
Transportation task of “Conduct preventive maintenance on a HMMWV” was dropped.  Enabling a 
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Soldier with enhanced communications or information flow would not help him/her verify that the 
HMMWV was not leaking oil.     
The primary metric used for this decision was the number of participants who agreed that the 
Transportation task was impacted by a specific net-centric capability.  If >50% of the participants agreed 
that a link existed between a task and at least one net-centric capability, then the task was retained for 
further investigation in the FNA and FSA.  This decision rule yielded 103 Transportation tasks.  
However, to ensure that critical tasks were not missed, if a task had less than seven participants respond to 
it, it was kept.  This increased the number of Transportation tasks to 119.   Additionally, during the focus 
group discussions, five “new” Transportation tasks were identified that participants claimed were in need 
of net-centric capabilities.  These tasks were “new” as they were not captured in the questionnaire.  
The result of the FAA was the identification and validation of Transportation Soldier tasks, 
conditions, and standards that could be impacted by network-enabled capabilities. The FAA process 
culminated in 124 Transportation Soldier tasks deemed impacted by net-centric capabilities, which were 
inputted into the FNA. The FNA Methodology is discussed in the next subsection. 
 
2.2 FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS (FNA) METHODOLOGY 
For the FNA, the research focused on the Individual Transportation Soldier’s ability to 
accomplish required tasks to standard as identified in the FAA.  The overall FNA Methodology can be 
seen in Figure 4. The scenarios used in the FNA examined the Transportation Soldier as part of a 
Transportation unit and as part of a Combat Arms unit.  These scenarios were all based on the current 
year, located in Southwest Asia, with the unit’s current MTO&E (Modified Task Organization and 
Equipment), and on and around a FOB.  Those tasks that could not be accomplished to standard were 
assessed for risk and then mapped into the applicable NCOE capability gaps.  A risk assessment 
prioritized the capability gaps.  The prioritized listing served as an input into the FSA, thereby focusing 
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FIGURE 3. FNA Methodology 
2.2.1.      Identify Transportation Task Gaps 
The first step in the FNA process was to identify the critical Transportation Task gaps.  
Explicitly, to take the 124 Transportation tasks from the FAA and reduce the number of potential tasks to 
be evaluated in detail.  This step started by merging similar tasks and eliminating those tasks that would 
not occur within the confines of the FOB, resulting in 60 Transportation Tasks. 
One of the key tenets of the CBA process is to evaluate and analyze tasks against operational 
scenarios.  Therefore, the team binned the 60 Transportation tasks into eight operational scenarios in 
which questionnaire participants would be asked to perform or supervise the specified task.  These 
scenarios were designed to cover the three types of Transportation Missions (Mode, Terminal, and 
Movement Control) in the different locations across Southwest Asia.  These scenarios also included a 
“stressor” event in order to capture which tasks became increasingly difficult when mission tempo was 
high.   
Some of these 60 tasks fell into more than one scenario, which resulted in 121 Transportation 
Task instances across the eight scenarios.  The team was interested in seeing the level of success of the 
same task in different locations in order to determine if a specific type of location had “cracked the code” 
on how to accomplish the task successfully.  Evaluating varying circumstances for failure enabled 
detailed assessment of reasons for failure, leading to well-defined gaps. 
Another web-based questionnaire (FNA Q#1) asked participants to assess whether the 121 tasks 
could be performed to standard within the various scenarios.  If not, the questionnaire asked about the 
consequence to the overall mission.  The questionnaire had three distinct parts.  Part one was the core 
questions that would be presented to each of the respondents.  This consisted of 5 scenarios that placed 
the participant in the role of a senior NCO or junior Officer.  These scenarios were chosen based on 
previous interviews, lessons learned research, and sponsor guidance to key problems within the 
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community.  The rationale behind the questions on the core scenarios was to ensure that the team gathered 
the most information possible (had the largest sample size possible) about these tasks from participants. 
Part two was the “Choose your own adventure” section.  Each participant was asked to choose one of the 
eight scenarios to answer questions about.  Each task had two questions within the scenarios: 
 
  Assume you have no cell phones or hand-held radios/PDAs/scanners, can you successfully 
perform this task in the scenario?   
 
Yes  No       Not Applicable 
 
If you answered “No”, what would be the consequence to the mission?  
(Choose "Not Applicable" below if you chose "Yes" or "Not Applicable" on the previous question) 
 
Catastrophic     Critical    Marginal     Negligible    
None         Not Applicable  
 
The third part of the questionnaire was the demographic data.  This questionnaire was posted for 
2 weeks and received 116 responses from the same groups responding to the first.   
Lastly, focus group discussions were used to collect data.  Multiple focus group discussions were 
conducted to gain further insights to FNA Q#1 topics.  Participants consisted of the same kinds of 
personnel who had previously participated.  
The data collected during this step of the process was then analyzed in order to identify the 
Transportation Task gaps.  The primary metrics for finding the Transportation Tasks included percentage 
of participants that could not complete the task and the mission consequence.  Tasks that could be 
completed to standard or that had a low consequence to the mission were removed from further 
investigation (low risk). 
The top three tasks from each scenario (to gather breadth) were selected for continuation and the 
remainder of tasks were chosen based on high “risk” values (to gather depth).  This resulted in 33 
Transportation Task Gaps.  Additionally, the team added 4 “new” Transportation Tasks based on 
interview and discussion group results: Manage Contractors at the APOD (Aerial Port of Debarkation), 
Manage Contractors at the SPOD (Sea Port of Debarkation), Manage Contractors at the CRSP (Central 
Receiving & Shipping Point), and Communicate with Subordinates in a Marshalling Yard.   
 
2.2.2.    Associate Task Gaps with Net-centric Capabilities 
The second step in the FNA process was to associate the 37 Transportation Task Gaps identified 
as “high risk” to net-centric Capabilities.  In order to accomplish this step, the 10 relevant NCOE 
capabilities were mapped to their attributes and then to their supporting measures in accordance with 
published references.  This was a bottoms-up approach to the association.  This mapping yielded 10-15 
possible measures for a capability.  Therefore, transcripts from previous interviews were reviewed along 
with the results of FNA Q#1.  This data enabled the selection of the most relevant and meaningful net-
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centric measures to the Transportation mission.  These measures became the “reasons” in the resulting 
FNA questionnaires, interviews, and discussions.  These reasons were critical to the process as this 
research is only interested in the net-centric reasons why tasks tend to fail.  For example, the team was not 
particularly concerned that forklift operators want to reduce the number of safety features in their 
equipment in order to gain more functionality, but with their lack of communications within their cab to 
interact with supervisors.  
Three modes of data collection were used for this step: a web-based questionnaire (FNA 
Questionnaire #2 with 18 respondents), telephone interviews (from the previous phase), and focus group 
discussions (10 sessions).    
   FNA Q#2 had three goals.  The first was to ascertain the reasons why tasks failed to be 
accomplished to standard.  The second goal was to gain a typical frequency of failure for each of the 37 
tasks based on the number of times a month a task was done.  This would be necessary to conduct the risk 
assessment for the prioritization step of the process.  The third purpose was to gain insight on the level of 
risk if the gap was not closed 100%.  This questionnaire was intended to be completed by Officers and 
mid-grade Non-Commissioned Officers.  It presented the participants with the definitions of the 
consequences and then the definitions of the possible net-centric reasons why the task could not be 
performed to standard.  An example of a net-centric reason is shown below.   
 
Availability:    I cannot access the data or information services required to accomplish this task.  
 
FNA Q#2 then requested that participants choose one of the six scenarios with which they were 
most comfortable or had the most experience accomplishing its subordinate tasks.  In the body of the 
questionnaire, each task was presented to the participant with the complete standard and then they were 
asked: 
 
I found it difficult to meet the standard because of the following reasons:   
 
 The participants were then given the list of net-centric reasons to rank.  At the end of the scenario, 
the participant was asked to rank the tasks (from 1 to n) based on difficulty and on performance.   
 
Rank them in order of their difficulty to perform to standard (1 being the hardest of the group, 2 being 
second hardest, etc). 
 
Rank them in order of their consequence to the mission when they are not done to standard (1 being the 
most severe consequence of the group, 2 being second severe, etc). 
   
 Focus Group Discussions were conducted with approximately 50 Transportation and Signal 
community subject matter experts (SMEs) to gain insights into the specific reasons that the identified 
Transportation tasks were not being completed to standard.  The study team conducted these sessions in 
person at Fort Gordon, GA and Fort Lee, VA.   
 FNA Q#2 yielded quality data even with a low response rate.  The participants ranged in rank 
from E7 to O4 and many took the time to write extensive comments about why tasks are difficult in a 
deployed environment.   
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 In addition to information gathered about the Transportation Tasks, comments from participants 
resulted in an additional capability being added to the analysis.  It was entitled ‘Basis of Issue’ in order to 
highlight difficulties facing Transportation Soldiers because equipment is available, however not to the 
correct people in the correct amount.  This resulted into 11 NCOE capability gaps that would be used in 
the remainder of the research.   
Once data retrieval was complete, each task was associated with the appropriate NCOE 
capabilities based on the net-centric reason for not being completed to standard.  The key was to only 
capture the first order net-centric capability gap in the associations.  For example, the questionnaire data 
indicated that the task, 
 
‘Coordinate onward movement of personnel and cargo’ 
 
was difficult to complete to standard in the MCT scenario due to ‘accuracy’ and ‘timeliness’ reasons.  
Interview data confirmed these reasons with comments such as,  
 
“Planning onward movement of people and cargo requires up-to-date, accurate 
information about transportation routes and carriers.  Currently, there is no one system 
to provide planners with the situational understanding of neither what assets are 
available nor what assets are currently on the road/air/sea.”   
 
‘Accuracy’ and ‘timeliness’ are attributes of the net-centric capability ‘Situational Understanding’.  These 
attributes, combined with interview data, led to the association of ‘Coordinate onward movement of 
personnel and cargo’ to the net-centric capability ‘Situational Understanding’.   
 This analysis continued for all the 37 Transportation tasks/scenario pairs. Twenty-seven were 
found to generate NCOE capability gaps.  The remaining 10 tasks would not result in gap closure through 
the introduction of network-enabled.  Additionally, it should be noted that 13 of the 37 tasks were placed 
in multiple NCOE capabilities.  Therefore, there were 44 Task/Capability instances to be prioritized in the 
next steps. 
 
2.2.3.   Prioritize Transportation Task Gaps within NCOE Capabilities  
The third step in the FNA process was to prioritize the Transportation Tasks within each NCOE 
Capability Gap through the examination of risk.  These results were then combined under the principle of 
risk adverseness into the final ranking.  
  The first data set was generated by a group of participants (Transportation Soldiers and Leaders) 
who took FNA Questionnaire #3 (FNA Q#3).  FNA Q#3 was similar to the other questionnaires as it was 
scenario based.  However, this time all participants completed each scenario and the target audience was 
only senior NCOs and Officers.   
  In this questionnaire, participants were given the 44 tasks (with their specific net-centric gap) 
binned into the 6 scenarios.  Each task was given with its standard and a short statement on the net-centric 
reason that there was a gap.  The participants were asked the following two questions per task in each 
gap: 
 
What is the consequence of this gap to the mission?  
Catastrophic     Critical    Marginal     Negligible    
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None         No Answer  
 
What percentage of time does this gap cause the task NOT to be accomplished to standard?  
0% to 20% 21% to 40%  41% to 60% 61% to 80% 81% to 100% 
 
Participant responses were then used to assess risk based on consequence and frequency. 
   The second data set was from senior leaders and analysts within CASCOM. The Transportation 
Tasks to NCOE Capability Gaps mapping was presented to representatives from CASCOM’s Concepts 
division, Futures division, and DPMO (Deployment Process Modernization Office).  An in-depth 
discussion was held on the nature of the gaps and the reasons behind the tasks not being able to be 
performed to standard.  CASCOM then provided an independent evaluation and ranking of Transportation 
task prioritization.   
  The third data set was pulled from FNA Q#1.  This data was predominantly used to resolve 
discrepancies between the first two data sets.  Each task was assigned a ranking based on the consequence 
and the percentage of participants that felt the task was difficult to accomplish to standard.   
The analysis portion of this step started with the first data set (FNA Q#3). However, this analysis 
was not straightforward as the relationship between the consequence levels is not strictly linear.  The 
associated consequence value and average frequency value were used to graph each task (within a NCOE 
capability) on a risk assessment chart.  This data enabled a loose ranking to be determined amongst the 
tasks within the capability.  This ranking was then compared to the CASCOM provided rankings of the 
tasks within the NCOE capabilities (Data Set #2).   
For most tasks, both data sets were fairly similar and the final ranking of tasks was 
straightforward.  The final prioritization of the Transportation Task gaps within the NCOE capability gaps 
can be found in the official TRAC-Monterey ISTWN FNA Report.  
 
2.2.4. Capability Gap Prioritization 
The final step in the FNA process was to prioritize the 11 net-centric capability gaps, having 
already prioritized the tasks themselves.  This prioritization was performed using four different data sets.  
These results were then combined under the principle of risk adverseness.  The capabilities were binned 
into three tiers based on accuracy and fidelity of data.  All capabilities within a tier were assumed to be of 
equal importance.  Tiers helped alleviate any false precision in the results as there is always some 
uncertainty when combining qualitative assessments.   
The first data set was the information from FNA Q#3.  The second data set was from the 
Concepts division of CASCOM.  The third data set was from the Futures division of CASCOM.  The 
final data set was the information from FNA Q#1 and Q#2 which was only used in case of significant 
disagreement of the first three sets about a capability.   
 13
The concept of risk aversion was used during the binning of the net-centric capability gaps.  
Therefore, the five high level tasks from the FNA Q#3 analysis automatically made the Tier 1 category.  
Interesting enough, three of those five tasks were also high according to the CASCOM participants.  Then 
the remaining capabilities were analyzed to determine binning.   
 
2.2.5. Council of Colonels  
In accordance with the CBA process, a Council of Colonels (CoC) was convened to review the 
results of the FNA.  The council consisted of eight O6 Signal Officers, one O5 Signal Officer, one former 
O6 Transportation Officer (currently GS-15 at the Transportation School), one O6 Transportation Officer, 
one Army Reserve O6 Transportation Officer, and a GS-15 Operations Research Analyst.  The members 
of the council had multiple years of deployed experience within Southwest Asia.   
The consensus of the group was positive about how the FNA process was conducted and the 
results found.  Additionally, the feedback led to a re-structuring of the net-centric capability gaps into two 
tiers due to the fidelity of the data provided.    Table 1 provides a summary of the final prioritized results 






Create & Produce Information 1 
Decisions and Planning 1 
Relationships 1 
Situational Understanding 1 









TABLE 1. FNA Results 
This research found that the operational risk to the mission from an Individual Transportation 
Soldier not being able to accomplish their assigned tasks is High based on the sub-set of tasks analyzed in 
this study.  The TRAC-Monterey ISWTN FNA report has a complete listing of the eleven net-centric 
capabilities and their definitions.  Additionally, the subordinate Transportation tasks are discussed in 
depth to include the reasoning behind the mappings.  Overall, the output of the FNA is prioritized 
capability gaps, which are the input into the FSA. The FSA Methodology is discussed in the next 
subsection. 
 
2.3  FUNCTIONAL SOLUTIONS ANALYSIS (FSA) METHODOLOGY 
For the FSA, the research focused on possible solutions for the Individual Transportation Soldier 
to overcome their Transportation task deficiencies (as identified in the FNA) through net-centric 
capabilities.  The overall FSA Methodology can be seen in Figure 5.  This began with SME discussions to 
develop potential net-centric solutions for Individual Transportation tasks.  These solutions were merged 
into several packages in order to cover the priority Transportation tasks.  Using multi-attribute decision 
theory methods, the 336 packages were analyzed against each other based on their estimated performance 
and required resources.  Therefore, we identified the “best” package to fix the most prominent problems 
while maximizing effectiveness and minimizing required resources.  The output of the FSA was 
recommended packages to be implemented within the Transportation and Signal Communities in order to 
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2.3.1.   Idea Generation 
Purely materiel solutions are not always the best answer.  Many times, a process change or re-
alignment of personnel can solve the problem.  Therefore, the first step in the FSA process is to identify 
and characterize potential solutions across the DOTMLPF spectrum.  This was accomplished through 
individual interviews and focus group discussions.  These were conducted with SMEs from the Signal 
Center, CASCOM, and various acquisition program management offices.  Additionally, the civilian 
sector was researched to determine insights from their best business practices, especially in the areas of 
in-transit visibility and handling frustrated cargo.  Finally, a brainstorming workshop was conducted with 
SMEs in late August.  Over the course of two days, 104 solutions across the DOTMLPF domain were 
discussed. 
Upon the review of the 104 proposed solutions, it was found that some of them would typically 
be performed together.  Additionally, many of the solutions were very specific and could be combined 
into a more generalized solution (as is appropriate for an FSA).  This step was necessary not only to 
reduce the number of possibilities that SMEs would be asked to evaluate but also to simplify the 
complexity of the analysis phase as independent solutions would be required.  Ultimately, 31 solution sets 
were created during this process.  
The attributes for evaluating the potential solutions were chosen based on professional military 
judgment (PMJ), the FNA Council of Colonels’ recommendations, and U.S. Army Capabilities 
Integration Center (ARCIC) guidance.  ARCIC’s guidance is that all solutions must be 1) strategically 
responsive, 2) feasible, and 3) realizable.  Therefore, to ensure that the solutions were meeting the 
guidance, the following attributes were chosen to be evaluated: 
 Transportation Task Gap Closure 
 Time to Implement (Schedule) 
 Affordability (Cost) 
 Supportability 
 Feasibility  
 Technological Risk 
 Operational Risk   
Leaders from CASCOM, Signal Center, and various other Signal Officers used their PMJ to 
evaluate the proposed solution sets against six of the attributes.  ARCIC guidance and professional 
military judgment was used to determine rough evaluations of cost.      
 
2.3.2. Identify Approaches/Portfolios of Solutions 
  The goal of the FSA was to find solutions that mitigate the Individual Transportation Soldier net-
centric capability gaps.  However, NCOE is a fully integrated spectrum of inter-dependent concepts and 
the recommended solutions needed to span the environment.  Additionally, all 31 solution sets have 
second and third order effects on the environment.  Even considering those effects, not a single one of the 
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solutions sets covered all 11 net-centric capability gaps, let alone just the 26 Tier 1 gaps.  Therefore, a 
grouping of the solution sets was implemented in order to ensure effective coverage of the Tier I net-
centric capability gaps (as defined by FNA).  These groupings are termed Integrated Approach Packages 
(IAPs) which included both material and non-material solutions.  The creation of these packages was the 
second step of the FSA process.   
A morphological analysis approach was used to create the IAPs.  The IAPs were created under 
two distinct sets of rules.  The first set was based on gap coverage.  Gap coverage was chosen as it is the 
main impetus from the sponsor – to effectively cover the gaps.    IAPs were created by combining the 
solution sets to achieve at least moderate coverage of the tasks in the Tier 1 and to minimize redundancy 
of task coverage.   
  The second set of IAPs were created based on cost.  Cost was chosen as it is an important factor 
for decision makers when considering new programs of record.  IAPs were then created by combining the 
solution sets to achieve coverage of at least 75% of the tasks in the Tier 1 by only using low cost solution 
sets.  Like the task coverage IAPs, the cost IAPs were also created to minimize redundancy.    
 The end state of this FSA step is 336 IAPs consisting of five to twelve component solution sets. 
 
2.3.3. Integrated Approach Packages (IAP) Assessment 
  In order to make a decision between IAPs, there needed to be measurable performance attributes 
to compare.  However, to ask SMEs to evaluate 336 IAPs on numerous attributes would be too difficult.  
Therefore, the information already collected from the SMEs on the attributes of the individual solution 
sets was used to determine attribute values for each IAP.  This was the third step of the FSA process.   
 We explored the emergent behavior of the IAPS to determine their attribute values.  Since all of 
the IAPs are specific combinations of the solution sets, their interactions needed to be examined in order 
to determine their effectiveness. Conceptually, the IAP is a System of Systems construct with the solution 
sets as subordinate systems.  After studying the IAPs’ behavior, three basic methods were established to 
determine attribute values.   
 The first method relied heavily on professional military judgment (PMJ) and was used for the 
task coverage attribute.  There are two possible cases.  If, for a specific task, the IAP only has one 
component solution improving the task gap, then the IAP took on that value for that task.  Otherwise, if 
an IAP had more than one component solution improving a specific task gap, then PMJ was used to 
qualify the emergent behavior of the IAP on the task.  Then the solutions were examined to determine if: 
1) Solutions work on same aspect of the task gap 
2) Solutions complement each other 
3) Solutions degrade each other’s effectiveness 
The answers to these questions were used to determine if the IAP value remained at the maximum rating 
of the components or if it received a ‘+’ or a ‘-‘ based on its interactions.   
 The second method was the maximal rule and was used for the schedule attribute.  As all of the 
solution sets were constructed to be able to be executed independently of each other, the maximum time it 
takes to execute a component is the time it takes to execute the entire IAP.   
The third method was the additive rule and was used on the remaining five attributes.  This rule 
will be explained through the exploration of the cost attribute although it was similarly executed for the 
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other four attributes.  FSA guidance does not require a complete life-cycle cost analysis to be completed 
for each IAP because this is beyond the scope of a CBA.  Instead we used a qualitative assessment based 
on the experience of personnel in the acquisition community in which they assigned values of High, 
Medium, and Low to the individual solutions.  These values were combined within each IAP to create a 
cost score.  The remaining attributes were determined similarly based on SME input, ARCIC guidance, 
and statistical analysis.  End state of this step was the assignment of an estimated value for each of the 
seven attributers for all IAPs.   
2.3.4. Analysis of Integrated Approach Packages (IAPs) 
The fourth step in the FSA methodology was the analysis of the 336 IAPs using multi-attribute 
decision theory in order to determine the “best” IAP to implement. The Option Selection and Analysis 
Tool (OpSAT), developed by Sonalysts, Inc for DoD use in multi-attribute decision making (MADM), 
was used to support this analysis.   
This research began with examining gap coverage, schedule, and cost as the ranking criteria and 
the remainder as selection criteria.  In addition, the analysis was completed with different weighting 
schemes when comparing the ranking attributes.   Scheme A examined the effectiveness of IAPs when the 
Gap Coverage was the most important attribute.  This is a valid strategy because the purpose of this FSA 
is to select the best IAP to implement that will effectively cover the gaps while minimizing resources 
required.  Scheme B examined the effectiveness of IAPs when the Cost was the most important attribute.  
This strategy was studied as cost tends to be a large driving factor for decision makers whether it is a 
quick policy change or a new program of record.  Finally, scheme C examined the effectiveness of IAPs 
when the Schedule was the most important attribute.  This strategy comes from the study constraints – 
namely, that the IAPs need to be able to be implemented in the near term (2010 time frame) to ensure that 
they are focused on getting solutions quickly into the hands of the Soldiers in combat environments.   
  The results of all the weight schemes were analyzed to determine how the various IAPs behaved 
and which weight schemes matched the best with the decision-makers’ experience and directions.  The 
IAP “top contenders” for each of the above schemes are shown in the results section.  The TRAC-
Monetary ISTWN FNA Report includes information about additional analysis runs, simulation 
construction and results, insights gained from the data, and trade-offs incurred by the IAPs when 
evaluated against more than three of the criteria.    
 
3.0 RESULTS 
Contrary to commercial technology marketing campaigns, it is not always a gadget that can best 
enable you to more effectively perform your mission.  The analysis conducted during the FSA clearly 
shows that a complete solution is composed of process changes, standardized policy, software 
interactions, new training initiatives, and some materiel solutions can be more effective than just giving 
the latest gadgets to the workforce.  The below table summarizes the primary analysis conducted in the 











TABLE 2.   “Top Contender” IAPs 
The Reader will note that information in Table 2 does not adequately explain the nature of these 
IAPs.  The entire description of these solution packages is beyond the scope of this paper but can be 
found in the TRAC-Monterey ISWTN FSA Report.  However, it can be noted that there are four IAPs 
that appear in the top tier no matter the weight scheme.  That indicates that those IAPs provide acceptable 
gap coverage, satisfy cost constraints, and can be fielded within an acceptable time frame.   
Within these four “top contender” IAPs, there are many common themes.  Namely, they all 
consist of the following individual solutions: 
 Field a radio with basic encryption at individual Soldier level  
 Authorize more communications devices at unit level to support rotational, attached 
personnel 
 Ensure policy supports contractors collaborating electronically 
 Develop TTPs that create a method for sharing information horizontally between units 
and vertically between units and headquarters to facilitate tracer actions 
 Improve tracking and reporting capabilities to determine movement asset location 
(trucks, etc) and cargo contained in assets, by integrating multiple systems into a single 
tool for complete ITV 
 Allocate and utilize current Army asset-tracking capabilities to other military services 
and non-military organizations (contractors, etc) 
 Modify Movement Control Battalion TOE so that in times of deployment, appropriate 
Air Force (AF) personnel are assigned to the unit.  Develop habitual training relationships 
with supporting AF units. 
 Train individuals on automated tracking & reporting 
 Provide MOS-independent training focused on reliable and accurate cargo documentation 
and consequences of incorrect data; training should be accessible from any location 
 Ensure Unit Movement Officers complete sustainment training 
 Make SMEs available to provide guidance to unit level Commanders on movement tasks 
 Train Port Support Activity personnel on C2 organization and relationships at the SPOD 
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 Establish training for senior and mid-grade Officers & NCOs for relationships 
w/contractors, and contractor roles & responsibilities 
Also noted is that there are only two items that are a purely material solution within these IAPs.  
In fact, the In-Transit Visibility solution consists of integrating the current systems into a single device 
and does not call for a new material solution.   
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
During this research, we confirmed the existence of Transportation tasks conducted in a deployed 
environment that are not easily performed to standard in which elements of net-centricity could help.  
Then we further quantified the tasks, their conditions, and the specific net-centric capabilities that are 
missing.  This was followed by a prioritization of the gaps.  Finally, over 300 solution packages (with 
component solutions from both the Signal and Transportation communities) were analyzed against the 
decision-makers’ criteria to result in several “top contender” packages.  It is expected that these packages, 
when executed, will mitigate the operational and security risks associated with the ad hoc acquisition of 
COTS tools and will address the wide range of net-centric requirements that Transportation Soldiers face. 
This research was challenging because it assesses the intersection of two communities: the Signal 
Corps and the Transportation Corps.  That is, the study was commissioned by the G-6 but the tasks 
involved are under the cognizance of the G-4.  While research and experimentation in the area of 
network-centricity almost always revolves around command and control for combat operations, there 
have been few studies examining what network-centricity means in force sustainment operations.  While 
the originators of network-centric warfare say their principles are applicable in any business domain, little 
work has been done to map the capabilities of network-centricity (as defined in the NCOE JIC, JOC and 
JFC) to specific tasks.  This study did just that: breaking new ground by mapping doctrinally-defined 
every-day Transportation Soldier tasks to network-centric principles.  It helps answer the question "what 
can network-centricity do for me?" and can serve as a starting point for aligning required capabilities 
between the G-6 and G-4.  This new ground also proved to be most challenging because the measures for 
network-centricity do not match the measures of effectiveness for transportation.  It is believed that the 
overall methodology of this study in identifying the highest-risk domain-specific tasks with their 
associated measures and then mapping their reasons for not being performed to standard to network 
centric capabilities is the correct approach.  It brings together those usually concerned with C2 (and 
associated systems) and those concerned with other activities.  This study confirmed that those groups 
tasked with defining requirements for C2 cannot operate independently of the communities that they 
support in today’s environment.  However, network-centricity cannot be a solution for all issues and this 
approach can help identify the ways in which they can.  Systems should exist to support Soldiers doing 
their jobs, and justification for those systems or non-materiel changes must be rooted in the effect desired, 
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